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coupled with the totality of external in-
centives enable or constrain high-risk
behavior that can lead to conflict.
The construct of war avoidance is fur-
ther addressed by examining the nature
of specific governments involved—inter-
course between well established demo-
cratic nations, between democracies
and nondemocracies, and between non-
democratic states. By reference to his-
torical examples and by examining the
factors that influence the conduct of
states, Moore concludes that the nature
of the government alone may not be
nearly as important in creating effective
deterrence as the aggregate of external
incentives, “which may be high or low,
adequate or inadequate.”
In concluding that the best theory of
war avoidance will use the “full human
arsenal of insights against war,” Moore
carefully identifies the entire quiver of
measures available to decision makers
to achieve security. These include but
are not limited to: diplomacy, the exis-
tence of unequal power between adver-
saries, the willingness to precommit
forces to a troubled area, the existence
of arms control agreements, and mu-
tual participation in international orga-
nizations. Similarly, Moore carefully
analyzes those factors that influence the
leadership elite to employ the military
instrument—the absence of democracy,
the absence of effective deterrence, and
most importantly, the synergy of an ab-
sence of both.
The “incentive theory” is further tested
in its application to instances of terror-
ist violence, specifically to the U.S. re-
sponse to the 9/11 attack by al-Qa‘ida,
and finally, to the 2003 war with Iraq.
Arguing that assessing and influencing
the incentives of the decision elite who
run terror networks may be even more
effective than terror, Moore suggests
that extremists will no longer choose to
pursue it. Arguing that the incentive
theory fits the Afghan War “like a glove,”
Moore also posits that had Saddam
Hussein focused more clearly on the in-
centives affecting President George W.
Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair, he
would have understood that his only
opportunity to avoid war was a highly
visible effort to achieve full compliance
with Security Council resolutions.
In assessing the way forward, the author
urges the positive consequences for for-
eign policy of a paradigm rooted in the
importance of internal and external in-
centives. As long as incentives within
certain nations do not properly operate
to control these scourges, incentives
must be supplied externally. Moore
argues that by considering the operation
of collective security in deterrence terms,
created through effective incentives, an
essential element of foreign policy can
be both preserved and enhanced.
JAMES P. TERRY
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired
Flanagan, Stephen J., and Michael E. Marti, eds.
The People’s Liberation Army and China in Tran-
sition. Washington, D.C.: National Defense
Univ., 2003. 364pp. $34.50
Based on an October 2001 conference
at the National Defense University, but
published with revised papers two years
later, this collection of seemingly mis-
cellaneous essays all too often either
misses the mark completely or treats
only very lightly a long list of potential
U.S.-Chinese problems.
After an introduction, the book is di-
vided into six sections examining
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respectively, China’s fourth-generation
leadership, growing nationalism, mili-
tary trends, key policy challenges,
U.S.-China military relations, and, fi-
nally, future options for U.S.-China
relations.
Part 1 includes essays by Bates Gill and
David Shambaugh. Although these
chapters are well written, many of the
political leaders and structural issues
they describe in such detail have
changed since they were submitted. For
example, Jiang Zemin did resign, and
many indicators suggest that he did so
unwillingly. Jiang’s remaining power
base, or guanxi network, may therefore
be severely limited. Meanwhile, the
membership of important structural
bodies such as the Central Military
Commission, rather than going down
from eleven to eight and staying there,
was later increased from eight to thir-
teen, thereby giving Hu Jintao crucial
support to retire Jiang Zemin.
The dangers inherent in Chinese na-
tionalism are discussed in chapters by
Nan Li and Edward Friedman. Li’s es-
say, in particular, gives real insight in
his discussion of the continuing impor-
tance of “face” in China. This cultural
characteristic, he argues, can have an
enormous impact on how Chinese as-
sess their enemies: “To save face, or not
to lose it, for instance, the incentive is
not only to show self-righteousness or
all the good, positive, and strong points
of the self but also to show the evil, neg-
ative, and weak points of the other,”
which can result in “an exaggeration of
the strength of the self and the weak-
ness of the enemy.” When joined with
the Maoist idea of “voluntarism, which
stresses the power of the mind and con-
sciousness that can overcome obstacles
of material conditions,” the two can
create a deadly combination in which
the “PLA strategic analyses may reflect
not the balance of forces in the real
world but rather an overestimation of
PLA strength and an underestimation
of the adversary’s abilities.” Friedman
adds to this dire warning by stressing:
“The political atmosphere in this China
precludes accurate descriptions of Ja-
pan, America, or Taiwan and makes
self-interested, common-sense compro-
mises by the Chinese government seem,
to many Chinese, to be virtual treason.”
James Mulvenon, Bernard Cole,
Richard Fisher, and Richard Bitzinger
contribute worthy essays describing
Chinese military reforms, naval and air
units, and the level of military expendi-
ture. Although technically sound and
informative, these essays reflect the ex-
treme fluidity in China’s military mod-
ernization. It is potentially dangerous
to predict China’s strategic behavior
solely by observing her military. Cole,
for example, even while concluding that
China’s navy is focused mainly against
any “East Asian force that stands in the
way of achieving China’s objectives in
the region,” appropriately hedges his
bets in an endnote (no. 21) by admit-
ting that China might also consider it a
“justified risk” to fight the United
States if it feels “backed into a corner.”
Fischer, meanwhile, takes the bull by
the horns when he warns that the air
force “could gain a measure of superi-
ority on the Taiwan Strait after 2005.”
Key policy challenges are examined by
David Finkelstein, Cynthia Watson,
John Tkacik, Eugene Rummer, Kevin
Neader, and Howard Krawitz. Taken
together, the contradictions and po-
tential flash points discussed in these
essays present a scary picture, with
Watson admitting that if ordered to do
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so the People’s Liberation Army would
“likely choose the historical responsibil-
ity of keeping Taiwan part of China”;
Thacik counters that the Taiwanese
“will not permit an accommodation of
China’s demands that Taiwan become
subordinate to Beijing.” This standoff is
a recipe for disaster, but one that is all
too often obscured and glossed over
rather than highlighted.
Finally, U.S.-China military relations
are addressed by Paul Godwin and Al-
fred Wilhelm, Jr., while U.S.-China re-
lations in general are outlined by
Richard Thornton and David Lai. These
authors again present a mixed bag, with
Godwin warning of a U.S.-Chinese “es-
calation dynamic expanding the scope
of the war beyond the intent of either
adversary”; Wilhelm calling for remov-
ing “all remaining military-related
sanctions on the PRC” and promoting
increased military-to-military talks;
Thornton advocating measures to
“curb” Chinese ambitions “now before
China becomes too strong to control
and we find ourselves on the path to
war ”; and Lai arguing that the China
threat has been “overblown.” Since the
book does not include a much-needed
conclusion to sort through this morass,
or an index to assist in locating particu-
lar topics of interest, the reader is left
with the unfortunate impression that
the experts could not agree with each
other, much less with the editors, on
what final message they should present
to their audience.
While many essays in this book are
quite good, they do not work well as a
whole. One is left with the feeling that
the editors published whatever they
were given, with one essay on the air
force numbering almost forty pages,
while a scant four pages are devoted to
China’s all-important relations with
Russia, where the bulk of the PLA’s
most deadly weapons are purchased.
Furthermore, there is no chapter de-
voted specifically to Sino-Japanese rela-
tions, though various authors admit
that Japan is China’s nearest great
power and maritime rival. Equally rele-
vant topics not raised by this book in-
clude rising tensions over North Korea;
China’s space program and the rapid
growth of its missile forces; territorial
disputes in the South China Sea; and
the U.S.-led efforts with Japan, and
perhaps even Taiwan, to build theater
and national missile defense. For these
reasons, this book falls short as an ex-




Merom, Gil. How Democracies Lose Small Wars:
State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria,
Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Viet-
nam. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003,
295pp. $22.99
In this work, Gil Merom, an assistant
professor of political science at Tel Aviv
University, sets forth an intriguing
proposition based on case studies of
conflicts occurring in the second half of
the twentieth century. Democracies, he
argues, fail to win small wars because,
as democracies, they are unable to bear
either the casualties, particularly from
among the “educated middle class,”
that such wars produce or the brutality
winning such wars requires. If valid, the
implications of proving such a hypothe-
sis are significant. For starters, a hard
blow would be dealt to the interna-
tional relations school of realism and its
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